5. Preparation for the terrorist attack

5.1 The influence of the Oslo terrorist

1

A copy of the Oslo terrorist’s manifesto was found on the SD card associated with the individual’s drone. There are a number of references to the Oslo terrorist in the individual’s manifesto. The individual also discussed him when interviewed by New Zealand Police on the afternoon and evening of 15 March 2019. We see much of what the individual said about the Oslo terrorist in his manifesto and at interview as trolling and he accepted as much when we spoke to him. We do, however, consider that the individual was significantly influenced by the Oslo terrorist and there are two aspects of this that warrant discussion.

2

The first is that the Oslo terrorist’s manifesto and his actions provide considerable guidance for would-be extreme right-wing terrorists. To a very large extent, the individual’s preparation was consistent with that guidance. This was evident in his joining a gym and bulking up with steroids, joining rifle clubs to gain firearms expertise, attempts at operational security generally, cleaning up electronic devices to try to limit what counter-terrorism agencies might discover after a terrorist attack and might detract from the “optics” of the exercise and the preparation of a manifesto to be released at the same time as the attack. In these respects, the guidance offered by the Oslo terrorist was largely operational in nature.

3

The second aspect of the influence of the Oslo terrorist on the individual’s planning is more subtle and, indeed, odd. In his manifesto and at his trial, the Oslo terrorist claimed to have helped re-establish the Knights Templar and to be “Justiciar Knight Commander for Knights Templar Europe”. The Knights Templar was a Christian military order founded in Jerusalem in 1119, which was active during the Crusades when there were military struggles between Christianity and Islam. The original Christian military order was suppressed in 1312. There are contemporary organisations that have adopted the name “Knights Templar”. But there is no credible evidence to suggest that an organisation as described by the Oslo terrorist exists.

4

In his manifesto the individual claimed to have “taken true inspiration from Knight Justiciar [the Oslo terrorist]” and to have received a “blessing” from him “after contacting his brother knights”. When interviewed by New Zealand Police on the afternoon and evening of 15 March 2019, the individual made similar claims and referred to the “reborn Knights Templar”. So in this respect there is further commonality between the actions of the individual and those of the Oslo terrorist. There is also a particular aspect of the individual’s conduct relating to this claim that we discuss in chapter 6 of this Part.

5.2 Obtaining a firearms licence

5

On 1 September 2017, just 15 days after arriving in New Zealand, the individual took the first step towards obtaining a firearms licence by paying the application fee. Four days later, he undertook and passed the required Firearms Safety Course.

6

He was required to provide two referees (one of whom had to be a near relative) who could speak to his suitability to possess firearms. The individual identified his sister Lauren Tarrant and gaming friend as his referees. New Zealand Police did not accept Lauren Tarrant as a referee because she could not be spoken to in person. In the end, gaming friend’s parent was added as a referee.

7

On 4 October 2017, a Dunedin-based Vetting Officer visited the individual at his home, interviewed him and inspected his firearms storage facilities. The Vetting Officer’s recommendation, based on that interview and inspection, was that the application should be approved. The individual’s referees were interviewed by a different, Waikato-based Vetting Officer in their home on 30 October 2017 (gaming friend) and 2 November 2017 (gaming friend’s parent). Neither of the two referees disclosed anything adverse about the individual.

8

The former Dunedin District Arms Officer approved the licence application on 16 November 2017. There is no record of when the licence was physically issued, but the individual would likely have received it via post approximately two weeks later. We know he had it by 4 December 2017 as this was the day he acquired his first firearm. We discuss the firearms licensing process in considerably more detail in Part 5: The firearms licence.

 Read Part 5: The firearms licence.

5.3 Firearms, ammunition and other equipment used in the terrorist attack

Firearms purchases

9

The details of the firearms that we know the individual purchased are provided in the table below. Although it is possible that the individual purchased additional firearms privately (as there was no requirement to keep records of private sales), we have seen no evidence to suggest such purchases. The firearms listed in the table were all purchased legally from New Zealand-based stores. The individual completed the required New Zealand Police mail order form¹⁴ for the firearms that he did not purchase in person, and these sales were all authorised by the former Dunedin District Arms Officer (or delegate).¹⁵ The mail order forms were collected to authorise the purchase of the firearms and, as we discuss below, ammunition and not for the purpose of keeping records of these purchases.

Table 5: The individual’s firearms purchases 2017-2018  

10

The individual later sold, via Trade Me, the Tikka T3X Lite stainless/synthetic rifle, Norinco SKS semi-automatic rifle, Ruger 10/22 semi-automatic rifle and Ranger TAC-12 SYN semi-automatic shotgun. He had the remaining six firearms with him on 15 March 2019. These were the Windham Weaponry WW-15 semi-automatic rifle, the Ranger pump action shotgun, the Mossberg semi-automatic shotgun, the Uberti lever action rifle, the Mossberg bolt action rifle and the Ruger semi-automatic assault rifle. We discuss below how some of these firearms were modified prior to the terrorist attack.

11

Prior to 15 March 2019, possession of military style semi-automatic firearms was restricted to those who had an E Endorsement on their firearms licences. The semi‑automatic rifles owned by the individual were military style semi-automatic firearms (as defined by law) only if fitted with magazines capable of holding more than seven cartridges. But at the time of purchase none of them were fitted with large capacity magazines and thus were not military style semi‑automatic firearms. Accordingly, the individual was able to buy these semi‑automatic rifles despite not having an E Endorsement. We discuss this in some detail in Part 5: The firearms licence.

Magazines

12

The individual purchased online a range of magazines from New Zealand-based businesses. Some of the magazines were later sold by the individual to members of the NZ Hunting and Shooting online forum. We provide details of the magazines purchased by the individual that were used in the terrorist attack on 15 March 2019 in the following table.

Table 6: The individual’s online purchases of magazines 2017-2018

13

The individual also purchased magazine couplers, which he used on 15 March 2019. These allowed him to attach two magazines together to facilitate quick reloading.

14

All of these firearm magazines were legally purchased by the individual. Prior to 15 March 2019, there were no regulations in place restricting acquisition of magazines, meaning that anyone could legally purchase a magazine of any capacity instore or online, without having to produce a firearms licence or complete a New Zealand Police mail order form.

15

The individual did not have an E Endorsement. So, it was illegal for him to put a large capacity magazine into his semi-automatic rifles. He was, however, legally able to use large capacity magazines in his Mossberg MVP Predator bolt action rifle. He told us that, on occasion, he had used large capacity magazines with this rifle at the Bruce Rifle Club if no one else was around.

Modifications to firearms

16

The individual also purchased firearms components and used these to modify his firearms. The modifications included:

1. adding sights to assist accuracy;
2. adding “buttstocks” to the semi-automatic firearms for better support;
3. adding a screw-in choke to the muzzle of a shotgun barrel, therefore reducing the spread of the pellets and improving the reach of the shot;
4. modifying the trigger (adding a super dynamic 3-gun model trigger mechanism) of a semi-automatic firearm, allowing for lighter trigger pressure and faster trigger resets when firing;
5. adding a muzzle brake to reduce recoil and therefore keep the firearm on target;
6. adding an ambidextrous charging handle to one of the semi-automatic firearms to make cocking the firearm easier;
7. adding a fore grip to the upper receiver of one of the semi-automatic firearms;
8. adding a bipod (an integral, adjustable front rest for use when firing) to the bolt action rifle to increase accuracy; and
9. adding a strobe light (a device used to produce regular flashes of light) to one of the semi-automatic firearms.

17

None of these modifications were illegal when the individual made them and several of those modifications are commonly made by firearms owners.

18

Community members asked us about these modifications and if the individual received assistance to make them. The modifications made to the weapons did not require technical firearms expertise. The New Zealand Police Armourer told us there are a number of online videos demonstrating how to modify the trigger as referred to above. Similarly, the New Zealand Police Armourer said fitting a muzzle brake is a “relatively simple task” and most muzzle brakes come with instructions to allow the purchaser to fit the item themselves.

19

When we asked the individual about the modifications he said that he thought some of them may have been made before he purchased the firearms in question but that he had personally completed all after-sale modifications, such as modifying the trigger mechanism, using the instructions that came on the packaging of the parts he bought or with guidance from videos online. We have seen no evidence to suggest that anyone assisted him to modify the firearms.

Ammunition

20

We do not know how much ammunition the individual purchased in total as most sellers do not keep records of the ammunition sold in store. We do know that on 24 March 2018, he spent $1,358.00 at Gun City Dunedin on 2,000 rounds of .223 calibre Remington 55Gr SP.

21

In addition, we are aware of 11 ammunition purchases made online between 5 December 2017 and 12 July 2018. The details of these purchases are provided in the table below. The individual completed the required New Zealand Police mail order form for these purchases.

Table 7: The individual’s online purchases of ammunition 2017-2018

22

Some people who spoke to us expressed concern about the amounts of ammunition that the individual acquired. The individual told us that he did not regard his purchases as uncommon as firearms owners often buy in bulk. Other people, including the New Zealand Police Armourer and ammunition suppliers, told us that the amounts of ammunition bought by the individual were not unusual. In any event, his purchases did not give rise to any reporting of concerns by the sellers to New Zealand Police.

Configuration of firearms used in the terrorist attack

23

We have identified the firearms the individual had with him on 15 March 2019. As well, we have described his acquisition of ammunition and magazines, and the modifications he made to some of his firearms. Bringing this information together, the firearms used by the individual in the terrorist attack were configured, when first used, as follows:

1. A Mossberg 930 semi-automatic 12-gauge shotgun with at least seven-shot magazine capacity, with capacity for one further shell in the breech. This firearm was fitted with a Bushnell “Red Dot” sight. The firearm contained nine “00 Buckshot” shells.
2. A Windham Weaponry WW-15 military style semi-automatic rifle fitted with a Magpul PMag D-60 magazine containing 60 rounds of ammunition. The sighting system on the rifle was a Sightmark Holographic sight. The trigger had been modified on, and the ambidextrous charging handle had been added to, this firearm. Other changes made were the addition of a buttstock, a muzzle brake and a fore grip.
3. A Ruger AR-15 .223 calibre military style semi-automatic rifle fitted with two Magpul PMag 40-round capacity magazines coupled together. The sighting system on the rifle was a VTX Strikefire “Red Dot” sight. The individual also attached the strobe light and a butt stock to this firearm.
4. A Ranger 870 pump action 12-gauge shotgun with a five-shot magazine capacity. The magazine contained four “00 Buckshot shells” with a fifth in the breech. The muzzle of the barrel was fitted with a screw-in choke.
5. An Uberti .357 Magnum lever action rifle with a tubular magazine with capacity to hold 13 rounds of .357 Magnum ammunition (12 in the magazine and one in the breech). The rifle was fitted with adjustable open sights.
6. A Mossberg Predator bolt action .223 calibre rifle which was fitted with a telescopic sight, a bipod and a Magpul PMag 30-round capacity magazine.

Incendiary devices

24

The four basic incendiary devices that the individual had in his car on 15 March 2019 were made by him. Those devices consisted of four, ten litre containers filled with petrol, with lighters and cans of accelerant (gun oil spray) duct-taped to their sides. The individual told New Zealand Police that he had intended to use the devices to set fire to the masjidain but had not done so. The materials used to make the devices can be easily purchased.

25

When we spoke to the individual’s property manager, they recalled a chance meeting with the individual one day in January or February 2019 at a hardware store and noticed four petrol containers in his trolley. The individual said he was going hunting in a remote area with no petrol stations and needed to have enough fuel in reserve to make sure he could get back. It is likely these were the same petrol containers the individual had on the day of the terrorist attack. 

Figure 8: An image of an incendiary device that was stored in the rear of the individual’s vehicle during the terrorist attack

^{Photo of an incendiary device removed from the individual’s car after the terrorist attack. The 10 litre container was filled with petrol and had lighters and a can of accelerant (gun oil spray) duct-taped to its side (Source: New Zealand Police).}

Other equipment for the purposes of the terrorist attack

26

The other equipment the individual used in the terrorist attack included the following:

1. A 2005 Subaru outback vehicle purchased in Dunedin on 21 August 2017.
2. A military style tactical vest and tactical gloves purchased online in New Zealand in December 2017. The tactical vest enabled him to carry and have quick access to numerous magazines on his person.
3. Two ballistic vests. We have been unable to establish where and when the individual purchased the ballistic vests.
4. Body armour inserted into his two ballistic vests, likely comprised of two ballistic ceramic plates and two plastic boards that he purchased online in December 2017 and January 2019 respectively, from overseas. When we spoke to the individual, he confirmed that the plates and boards were body armour.
5. The GoPro camera, which he purchased online in February 2018, in New Zealand.
6. A bayonet knife and scabbard purchased from a New Zealand-based store in early 2018.

27

We have been unable to establish where and when the individual purchased his helmet. We have examined the helmet. It is of a kind used for airsoft sports and is easily obtained in New Zealand.

5.4 Developing expertise with firearms

Rifle club membership

28

The individual became a member of two rifle clubs:

1. He became a member of the Otago Shooting Sports Rifle and Pistol Club on 14 February 2018, after attending a club shoot on 7 January 2018 as a visitor. He attended another shoot on 18 February 2018 but was not seen at a club shoot by members again. The weapons that could be used at this range were restricted, and high-powered hunting rifles and bottle-necked cartridge cases were not permitted. This meant that the range was of limited utility for his purposes. He occasionally went to the club alone as he could access the club using a combination code to unlock the gate (albeit that he was unable to do so in January 2019 when he took his mother and her partner there). Members did not have to record their use of the range outside of club shoots and therefore we do not know how many times he attended the Otago Shooting Sports Rifle and Pistol Club.
2. The individual also joined the Bruce Rifle Club on 26 February 2018, having completed probationary shoots. According to club records the individual shot there on 14 December 2017, 21 times in 2018 and a further five times in early 2019.

29

There was a suggestion that the individual may have also attended the Leith Valley Rifle Range. There are no records of him doing so.

30

Bruce Rifle Club members who were interviewed by New Zealand Police after the terrorist attack said that the individual was polite and courteous, worked hard during a working bee and did not talk much, if at all, about politics. They also said that he was not entirely familiar with the safety rules initially, but that he improved over time. These impressions were reinforced by three Bruce Rifle Club members who told us he was regular, normal and that nothing about him "jumped out" to them. They were not aware of any issues he had with any members of the Bruce Rifle Club.

31

Some differing views were expressed. One member of the Bruce Rifle Club described the individual as "a bit arrogant” but did not provide any specific examples of such behaviour. Another member described the individual as being aloof.

32

A few members of the Bruce Rifle Club said three aspects of the individual’s behaviour were slightly out of the ordinary and, with hindsight, may be significant:

1. The individual usually shot while standing up. He went through a large amount of ammunition and his primary interests appeared to be firing at extremely fast rates and changing magazines quickly.
2. The individual displayed considerable interest in the military background of one of the members, an interest that made that member uncomfortable.
3. Sometimes the individual made remarks that were interpreted as indications that he had access to a large capacity magazine. According to two members, the individual was of the view that it was lawful for him to own a large capacity magazine, provided the magazine was not fitted to one of his semi‑automatic rifles – a view that was arguably correct at the time, particularly as he had, from 4 March 2018, a bolt action rifle to which large capacity magazines could lawfully be fitted.¹⁷

33

When we spoke to him, the individual was very free in acknowledging what he saw as tactical errors in the execution of the terrorist attack but was less willing to accept that there had been any lapses in his operational security. Consistent with this, he claimed that the comments by club members about his shooting style were hindsight reconstructions and that a number of other shooters at the club would sometimes fire magazines quickly as “it was fun to do”. We are, however, left with the view that his shooting style was somewhat different from others at the club. This is unsurprising given his purpose in practising.

Firearms accident

34

On 13 July 2018 the individual’s right eye and thigh were injured in a firearms accident. He was treated at Dunedin Hospital’s Emergency Department. The individual told the Emergency Department Registrar that the injury was caused by a round of ammunition exploding while he was cleaning a rifle barrel.

35

The Registrar treated the individual by removing a metal fragment from his right eye, giving him a tetanus vaccination, administering intravenous antibiotics and referring him for an x-ray of his right thigh. The x-ray showed a small metallic fragment embedded in the individual’s thigh. The Registrar consulted with the hospital’s Orthopaedic Service, which advised leaving the metallic fragment in the individual’s thigh as it was unlikely to cause any issues.

36

The Emergency Department Registrar also consulted with the hospital’s Ophthalmology Service. The Ophthalmology Service carried out further testing, prescribed eye drops, antibiotics and paracetamol and made a follow-up appointment for the individual to attend the acute eye clinic on 23 July 2018. The Registrar who treated the individual in the Emergency Department did not notify New Zealand Police about the firearm accident.

37

While he was in hospital, the individual’s landlord rang him about property maintenance issues. During this call, the individual explained that he had accidentally discharged a firearm while cleaning it in the lounge.

38

The individual was discharged from the Emergency Department approximately five and a half hours after he arrived. The following day, the landlord went to inspect the damage caused by the shot. The hole was around seven millimetres in diameter and the bullet was lodged in a wooden beam above the ceiling. The landlord fixed the hole.

39

At the individual’s follow-up appointment with the Ophthalmology Service on 23 July 2018, the Ophthalmology Registrar found that his eye was healing well. The Registrar advised the individual that the service did not need to see the individual again unless he had any issues. We discuss whether the injury should have been referred to New Zealand Police in Part 6: What Public sector agencies knew about the terrorist.

40

The individual told us that at the time of the accident he was concerned the shot might have been heard and reported to New Zealand Police. He said he ran through in his mind a scenario of what he would say if New Zealand Police officers arrived to question him. As it turned out the accident was not reported to New Zealand Police. He told us that he also weighed up whether he should seek medical treatment, but his concerns about his eyesight outweighed his reluctance to bring himself to official notice. So, he went to the Emergency Department but with a prepared explanation.

41

We discuss later the explanations that the individual gave for how the accident occurred.

Figure 9: Timeline of the individual’s firearms activities in New Zealand

5.5 Getting fit and bulking up

Gym membership

42

The individual went to a gym in Dunedin from October 2017 to October 2018. He worked out there three to four times a week, always alone. He occasionally talked to other members at the gym, offering advice about exercise form and technique, or discussing his overseas travel.

43

In October 2018, the individual went on his third overseas trip from New Zealand. He did not go back to the gym after his return to New Zealand in December 2018. He told us that by this point he was trying to avoid doing anything that might draw attention to himself. He did, however, continue to work out at home.

44

Most of the gym members and staff who were interviewed by New Zealand Police after the terrorist attack described the individual in favourable terms, for example as a “nice guy who liked to travel” and “generous and willing to help”. On the other hand, two members who themselves were friends, said that “there was something about [the individual] that felt off”, and that he seemed like a “weirdo, but harmless”. Those same two members recalled the individual telling them once that he had shot himself while cleaning his firearm and thought he may have been using steroids based on a discussion the individual had with one of them.

45

One member of the gym interviewed by New Zealand Police after the terrorist attack said that they knew the individual as “Barry”. They said that this was how the individual had introduced himself. The gym member had no reason to doubt that the individual’s name was “Barry”, especially because this member was a friend of the individual on Facebook where his username was Barry Harry Tarry. We discuss the possible significance of this in Part 7: Detecting a potential terrorist.

Steroid use

46

On 18 December 2017, a doctor from the Dunedin South Medical Centre treated the individual for abdominal pain around the liver area. The individual told the doctor that he had been taking non-prescribed oral steroids and injecting testosterone. He said he had stopped taking the oral steroids on 10 December 2017 but was still injecting himself with testosterone two to three times a week.

47

The doctor said the individual presented with the “hallmarks of steroid overuse”, in particular that he was “moonfaced” (a reference to his then rounded face). The doctor warned the individual that taking the testosterone could have “long term consequences for his heart”. The doctor later told New Zealand Police that the testosterone the individual was using was “most likely [at] a dangerous level”. The doctor said that the individual felt that what he was doing was safe and he was cold and inflexible in his position.

48

The individual claimed to us that he had been using drugs that were similar to steroids and testosterone, a point to which we will return to in Part 6: What Public sector agencies knew about the terrorist.

49

The doctor referred the individual to Dunedin Hospital’s Endocrinology Service for treatment. On 20 December 2017, the Endocrinology Service sent a letter to the referring doctor with advice on potential treatment options and an offer to meet with the individual if needed. An appointment was not scheduled given the “pressure on clinics” at the time, and because the individual’s condition could be managed by his doctor.

50

New Zealand Police have not established the source of the individual’s supply of drugs, and did not find any during searches of his Dunedin flat or his car after the terrorist attack. Our inquiries indicate that the individual may have acquired steroids or similar drugs online.

51

Through his AliPay account, the individual bought 500 hypodermic needles, 300 syringes and 200 alcohol swabs on 8 February 2018 from a New Zealand-based medical supplies company. He had also purchased a smaller amount of each product from another New Zealand-based company on 29 September 2017. We think he likely used these needles, syringes and alcohol swabs to inject himself with testosterone.

52

We deal with whether the individual’s steroid and testosterone use should have been referred to New Zealand Police in Part 6: What Public sector agencies knew about the terrorist.

_{14. In relation to firearms and ammunition able to be purchased with a standard firearms licence, purchasers must fill out a New Zealand Police mail order form for any purchases they make online. They must send the form to their local District Arms Officer to authorise the sale. If the purchaser meets all of the requirements of the Arms Act 1983, the District Arms Officer will email the authorised form direct to the seller, who then finalises the sale.}

_{15. There are some inconsistencies in the dates of purchase for these firearms. The dates provided in the table are the dates the payments were made. The individual may have placed the orders slightly earlier, but for online purchases, the sale is not confirmed until New Zealand Police have authorised it.}

_16.

_{17. We say “arguably correct” as there is case law to the effect that possessing both a semi-automatic firearm and a large capacity magazine in circumstances that make it reasonable to believe that they have been used together is unlawful. See Police v Bruce DC Wellington CRN-5085022673, 30 May 1996.}